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Abstract
Hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz labour migrants seek opportunities in Russia where they fall target to retaliation of vigi-
lante citizens who find offence in the presence of alien labourers in their homeland. Vigilantism also takes place within this
migrant ‘community’ where male Kyrgyz labour migrants engage in retaliation on female migrants over perceived offences
such as dating non-Kyrgyz men. On several occasions between 2011 and 2016 videos featuring honour beating of female
labour migrants by fellow countrymen shook the internet. The selected case illustrates vulnerabilities experienced by mi-
grants due to xenophobia and hostility of the host state, as well as additional layers of vulnerabilities linked to gendered
biases that ‘travel’ across borders along with compatriots in migration. The study argues that offline structures, norms,
biases, violence, and stigma not only reincarnate online, where they culminate in vigilante acts, but consequently, they
re-enter the offline discourse and go through further normalization and justification.
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It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in pun-
ishing. (Foucault, 1977, p. 10)
1. Introduction
Social media and smart mobile devices brought about in-
trinsic changes to various aspects of modern life, includ-
ing the process and experience of migration. Digital me-
dia attests its unprecedented affordances for migrants,
such as access to crucial information, on-the-spot trans-
lation, navigation tools, and other services conveniently
accessible through a single device. As is evident from re-
cent literature on the role of digital media in the lives of
refugees, displaced people, andmigrants—smart mobile
devices, social media, and connectivity that they afford
can be positively instrumental during and after themigra-
tory journey. From coordination with others in the com-
munity, to maintaining contact with people back home,
to document storing—smartphones provide a “sense of
security” and help with “preserving memories” of the
journey (Alencar, Kondova, & Ribbens, 2018, pp. 12–13).
Social media is used by refugees for “acquisition of lan-
guage and cultural competences” and helps with “con-
tacting family and friends in the home country in or-
der to obtain social and emotional support” (Alencar,
2017, p. 1600). At the same time, there are certain “in-
formation precarities” experienced by refugees and dis-
placed people; such precarities constitute instabilities
and vulnerabilities to “misinformation, stereotyping, and
rumors” (Wall, Otis Campbell, & Janbek, 2017, p. 240).
This article aims to make a scientific contribution by ad-
dressing mediated vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz labour mi-
grants in Russia who are pushed out of their home state
by economic factors, and whose precarious status in the
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 230–241 230
host state amplifies their fragility in the digital domain.
In particular, the article inquires into how digital vigilan-
tism affects female labour migrants in the framework
of the digital divides (Miller & Norris, 2016; Ragnedda
& Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017; among others) that im-
ply divergence across groups and individuals in their ac-
cess to digital media, respective skills, as well as various
capitals and benefits of using these media. By address-
ing the selected case, this article aims to further inform
the scientific discussion, debate, and exchange on the
role, benefits, and harms that digitalmedia can bring into
the lives of migrants. The study considers how the es-
tablished social, political, and economic inequalities, as
well as racial, ethnic, and other biases transfer into the
digital sphere, thus reinforcing the “existing social rela-
tionships” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 243), where they “culmi-
nate in a coordinated mass persecution of a targeted cit-
izen” (Trottier, 2017, p. 61), and then re-enter the offline
sphere and discourse.
Falling target to vigilante citizens in the host state,
labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan engage in mediated
moral policing within their own perceived community.
On several occasions between 2011 and 2016 videos fea-
turing honour beating of female Kyrgyz labour migrants
by fellow countrymen shook the internet. Referring to
themselves as ‘patriots’, men, who do not reveal own
identity in the videos, humiliate and punish women over
perceived offences, such as being seen in public with
non-Kyrgyz males. Having found offence in women’s be-
haviour, the ‘patriots’ capture and beat their targets,
threaten them with knives, sexually assault them, film
the process, and spread the footage online (Beishinbek
Kyzy & Bigg, 2012; Botoeva, 2012; SOVA Center for In-
formation and Analysis, 2012; Ibraeva, Moldosheva, &
Ablezova, 2015; Lelik, 2016). Beyond the suffered embod-
ied harms, visibility of the targets is exploited (Trottier,
2017) as they are forced to reveal their names and home
addresses on camera, which intensifies harms and sets
paths for further online and offline retaliation, shaming,
and harassment.
Certain identity markers such as nationality, ethnic-
ity, religion, sexual orientation, and gender, as well as
social norms, and perceived obligations, affect the sub-
jection to and experience of digitally mediated citizen-
led retaliation. The selected case illustrates vulnerabili-
ties thatmigrants experience due to xenophobia and hos-
tility in the host state, as well as gendered biases and vi-
olence inside of the migrant ‘community’. Such vulnera-
bilities are, of course, numerous and extend across eco-
nomic factors, education, healthcare, employment con-
ditions, immigration status, and so on. This article fo-
cuses on vulnerabilities associated with subjection to vig-
ilante acts that instrumentalise embodied and digitally
mediated retaliation.
After elaboration on its methodology, the article pro-
vides a theoretical framework for digital vigilantism and
digital divides. In doing so, it covers respective literature
and the encompassing scholarly discussions. The article
proceeds to elaborate on various threats and vulnerabil-
ities faced by Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia amid the
multitude of ‘offences’ that certain targets emit. Women
are targeted by vigilantes in the host-state and by compa-
triots in migration. In this case, there are vulnerabilities
applicable to the general group ‘Kyrgyz labour migrants
in Russia’, as well as additional vulnerabilities experi-
enced by women within the group. Beyond this, women
experience barriers to seeking legal help, as sexual vio-
lence, shame, weak rule of law, and uncertain legal sta-
tus in Russia prevent them from being vocal. Appalling
public solidarity with vigilante acts in the home state
of Kyrgyzstan is informed by stigma, victim-blaming dis-
courses, and vulnerable positions of women within the
set social norms.
2. Methodology
Being part of the larger international and interdisci-
plinary project that investigates themanifestation of digi-
tal vigilantism across various political and social contexts,
the study relies on a mixed methodology. Though scarce,
the existing literature on the selected case assisted in
constructing an understanding of perceptions and pub-
lic reactions to instances of digitally mediated vigilante
retaliation. Semi-structured in-depth interviews with vig-
ilantes (1), human rights defenders (3), police (2), aca-
demics (1), NGO representatives (1), and journalists (3),
conducted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan in person and via
Skype, have further informed this research. Interviews
were conducted between April and June 2018. The op-
tion of interviewing targets of digital vigilantism was in-
tentionally avoided due to ethical considerations and do
no harm approach of the researcher. All featured inter-
viewees in the study are anonymised, which has no im-
pact on the substance and quality of the data. Interview
material particularly helped with the contextualisation
of digitally mediated retaliation and its impacts on tar-
gets within the Kyrgyz migrant ‘community’. Interviews
revealed instances of collaboration between law enforce-
ment officers and vigilante citizens in Russia, disclosing
curious nuances of acquired capitals and powers that al-
low media-savvy participants to apply pressure on the
police. Furthermore, the informants helped shed light on
the barriers that prevent targets from seeking legal help
both in the host state and in their home country.
3. Digital Vigilantism
Finding offence in other citizens, taking personal retal-
iation measures while filming the process and subse-
quently disseminating the footage online is a rampant
practice among various vigilante groups in Russia. In
the majority of cases, participatory practices are group
acts where citizens organise themselves around a se-
lected offence theme, such as exposing and punish-
ing alleged paedophiles, countering ‘unscrupulous’ mer-
chants, shaming parking ‘violators’, or busting ‘illegal mi-
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 230–241 231
grants’. This article relies on the concept of digital vig-
ilantism to address such acts. Researching vigilantism
through the prism of its digitalmanifestations should not
be perceived as a phenomenon limited to hacking and
doxing. Instead, digital vigilantism can be defined as “a
process where citizens are collectively offended by other
citizen activity, and coordinate retaliation on mobile de-
vices and social platforms” (Trottier, 2017, p. 56). As such,
embodied acts performed by vigilantes and broadcasted
online are also regarded as acts of digital vigilantism.
The element of digitally mediated exposure of targets
can bring about longevity and recurrence of the waves
of harms that a sole physical assault would not be able
to enact, thus intensifying and amplifying the impact
of retaliation. Russia’s neo-Nazi vigilante group Occupy
Paedophilia, for instance, engaged in intentional dissem-
ination of the footage of their punitive acts “in order to
extend the sexual humiliation and punishment beyond
the actual physical assault behind closed doors” (Kasra,
2017, p. 185).While such “unwanted’, “intense”, and “en-
during” (Trottier, 2017, p. 56) visibility is forced on the
targets, publicity can be the desired opportunity for vig-
ilantes, granting them social recognition as informal jus-
tice providers; although participants too can experience
negative consequences of own visibility.
Moncada (2017) proposes five core definitional di-
mensions of vigilantism, namely, social organisation,
targets, repertoire, justification, and motivation (pp.
407–408). Here it is important to consider respective bi-
ases that might subject certain categories of people to
being vulnerable to retaliation in specific contexts; i.e.,
ethnic/religious/sexual minorities, representatives of a
certain socio-economic class, women, migrants, etc. As
digital media brought about “dramatic increases in ha-
rassment, abuse, and threats targeting women” (Jane,
2017, p. 186), the very biology as an identity marker
can lead to vulnerability. When it comes to citizen re-
sponse to perceived offences, questions of motivation,
legality, and proportionality of retaliation arise. These
questions are, of course, also applicable to the autho-
rised state forces such as the police and the Federal
Migration Service. Unlike conventional vigilantes, who,
according to Johnston (1996), constitute autonomous cit-
izenship, in digital vigilantism participants assert “new
boundaries” (Trottier, 2017, p. 59) in their relationship
with authorised powers. Political, ideological, and other
convictions of vigilantes can be shared by members of
the state apparatus, and other functionaries holding le-
gal power and authority. Some vigilante groups in Russia
have even received presidential grants in support of their
activities (Favarel-Garrigues, 2018; Gabdulhakov, 2018)
in exchange for loyalty.
3.1. Vigilantism in the Absence of Police
When migrant communities find themselves in the situ-
ation where they are reluctant to turn to the formal po-
lice due to brittle immigration status in the host state,
resorting to informal policing within own group is a way
of maintaining unity and order. In his study on undocu-
mentedMozambicanmigrants in Johannesburg,Madsen
illustrates how internal migrant-over-migrant “policing
produces the moral community and not the other way
around” (2004, p. 174). As interaction with the formal
police forces can lead to “harassment and deportation”,
migrants rely on each other in the phenomenon which
Madsen describes as “neither policing in the traditional
sense nor vigilante activity, but rather, a form of commu-
nally effected non-violent policing” (2004, p. 173). Mi-
grants develop a dependency on each other for moral
policing, where “social exclusion is a highly effective form
of sanctions as survival depends on inclusion” (Madsen,
2004, pp. 188–189). Contrary to the case of Mozambi-
can migrants in Johannesburg, actions of the so-called
Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ largely fit the definition of digital vigi-
lantism. Acts of retaliation are filmed and distributed on-
line while shaming “serves as a moral justification in or-
der to facilitate information sharing and socially harmful
visibility” (Trottier, 2018, p. 171) where the subjective
moral motivations of the ‘patriots’ lead to acts of com-
munity policing.
Vigilante acts can be centred around offences that
imply the breaking of the law—“formal legal orders”; as
well as offences based on the violation of subjective so-
cial norms—informal “not legally codified” orders “es-
tablished and enforced by a range of non-state actors”
(Moncada, 2017, p. 407). Applying this scheme to the se-
lected case of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia stipulates
that unlawful employment and violation of immigration
regulations resemble the breaking of the formal orders
in the host state. At the same time, migrants whose im-
migration status is in accord with the law still violate the
informal orders in the perception of certain groups and
individuals who view the very fact that foreigners live in
Russia as offensive. In addition to this, the case illustrates
that informal orders can be further violated within the
target group, creating layers of vulnerabilities that sub-
ject targets to retaliation.
3.2. Image as Power
In their 2015 study on media discourses surrounding
the case of Kyrgyz ‘patriots’, Ibraeva et al. conclude that
“male migrants find themselves in a situation of identity
destabilisation” amid the “loss of the normative role for
a traditional societymodel of masculinity” (Ibraeva et al.,
2015, p. 24). Furthermore, the authors discover that re-
spective discourses in the Russian and Kyrgyzmedia have
“framed violence as patriotic, truly male and ethnic” and
“became the backbone for new legitimation of violence”
(Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 25). These findings raise concerns
over frames and discourses that surround such acts of
crime. Traditional media reports not only justify violence
but can also aid the offenders in amplifying the harms of
undesired visibility by revealing the identity of targets in
the reports. In cases where online content would other-
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wise not be available to some audiences, traditional me-
dia reports assist in disseminating the message.
In its turn, social media enables spectators to partici-
pate in digitally mediated retaliation. As a result, the au-
dience is not just a passive observer; it plays an instru-
mental role in retaliation, intensifying and surpassing the
impact of embodied assaults. Members of the audience
can take sides and express their position on the issue
through ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’, shares, and comments. Some
vigilantes in Russia maintain an active and systematic ap-
proach to uploading videos on YouTube, with respective
viewings counting in millions. Although select videos can
get removed by platforms due to violent content, the
nature of file storing and sharing on social media en-
ables their continuous circulation. Besides, legal frame-
works, approaches and capacities for removal of harmful
content from platforms vary across contexts. While each
wave of circulation of media material exposing the tar-
gets brings about new waves of harms, the longevity of
online availability of thesemedia implies the longevity of
their damaging impacts on the targets.
In mediated retaliation, traditional media reports
play a crucial role as their coverage of a given incident
can boost online searches and hype a particular case. Fur-
thermore, traditional media frame cases, participants,
and targets in their reports. If the victims are unable to
speak up (out of fear of further retaliation, shame, and
due to other reasons), their voice is missing. As is argued
by Jane (2017), in gendered cyberhate there is a “silenc-
ing effect” that leads to self-censorship of female targets
(p. 191).Meanwhile, vigilanteswho have an interest in in-
strumentalising their visibility enjoy the publicity. On top
of this, participants’ (in)formal collaboration with the po-
lice further limits targets in options for seeking legal help,
as dysfunctionality of the legal system and structural ad-
vantages of vigilantes prevail.
4. The Digital Divides…and Unites
Scholars working on theorisation of the notion of digital
divides (among others: Miller & Norris, 2016; Ragnedda
& Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017) suggest a three-level dis-
tinction where the first level concerns physical and ma-
terial access to electricity, the internet, and devices; the
second level focuses on the character of use of digitalme-
dia, respective skills and savviness of the users; while the
third level of digital divides looks into different types of
capital and benefits of using digital media. Within their
definition of the digital divide, Miller and Norris (2016,
p. 2) suggest that:
[S]ocial inequalities and power relationships that ex-
ist online at any given moment or in any given space
shape, and are shaped by, access to and uses of ICT.
To the extent that men and women are socialized dif-
ferently and unequally, offline gender roles, responsi-
bilities, and opportunities influence online behaviour
and any corresponding benefits.
As such, at the third level, people’s background and var-
ious types of acquired capital influence how they “rein-
vest valuable information in the social realm” (Ragnedda
& Ruiu, 2017, p. 25). Certain discourses and acts can cre-
ate a sense of unity for specific audiences in the us versus
them representation of targets, i.e., men versus women,
migrants versus locals, sexual minorities versus majori-
ties, drivers versus pedestrians, merchants versus con-
sumers, etc. These unifying sentiments are constructed
over the condemnation of perceived norm breaching.
The “imagined” online communities (Gruzd, Wellman, &
Takhteyev, 2011) inform and inspire offline discourses
and acts. Among the many examples, this dynamic can
be illustrated by a vigilante group based in Chechnya
where participants find offence in how some Chechen
women dress. Vigilantes take pictures of their targets
and make use of the images that targets share on social
media. They expose women to the digital audience, but
also provide addresses of targets and call on offline ac-
tions, urging the relatives to take measures such as hon-
our murder for the perceived misconduct (BBC, 2017).
On their public platforms, participants warn the audi-
ence that only men can leave comments and that non-
Chechens will be banned from the discussion. Such cat-
egorisation creates a sense of unity among participants
and the audience. Online perceptions of unity are inter-
twined with the offline contestations of norms and nego-
tiation of us and them.
The discrepancy in the acquired benefits of social me-
dia use is evident in vulnerabilities and immunities of dif-
ferent users. The third level digital divide can be applied
tomediated capacities of actors involved. Userswith a so-
cialmedia following counted inmillions, obviously have a
greater audience outreach than thosewith just a few sub-
scribers. Respective traditional media framing and offi-
cial endorsement can turn vigilantes into informal public
leaders. In this regard, such publicity and endorsement
can grant vigilantes greater respect and support from the
audience than the official state police could enjoy. Fur-
thermore, traditional media and public discourses over
viral cases of digital vigilantism can further inform collec-
tive perceptions and reactions to these events and prac-
tices, and in doing so, further inform social frustrations,
biases, divides, and vulnerabilities.
In contexts where citizen involvement in justice mat-
ters is encouraged by the highest authority (in the case
of Russia, by President Putin), the police are by default in-
vited to collaborate with vigilante citizens (Gabdulhakov,
2018, p. 325). In this regard, the police can initiate formal
collaboration with vigilantes by calling for public involve-
ment in investigations and in the enforcement of legal
orders through citizen-led surveillance, snitching, and de-
nunciation of fellow citizens (The Moscow Times, 2018).
Such practices, however, are not limited to formal or-
ders and formal collaboration. The police and vigilantes
can engage in informal solidarity and patron-client rela-
tions. Beyond this, police officers are also subjected to
the power of visibility and can be respectively framed
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by vigilantes and/or by traditional media. As a Moscow-
based leader of a vigilante group explained:
Sometimes I blackmail the police. For instance, Imade
a critical post on Facebook and exposed the investiga-
tor, and so on and so forth. At first, I received a phone
call from the assistant of the Head of the press service
and he asked me to remove the post. I said, “I will not
remove anything, you deal with it yourself”. To this, he
said, “how can I help you?” I said, “put the paedophile
in prison, and I will write positively about you…[i]f you
take action, I will tell all media outlets how great you
are”. (Vigilante I)
This case exemplifies different media capacities of ac-
tors involved, which further complicates the relations be-
tween vigilantes, police officers, and targets.
5. Migrants in the Bullseye of the Host State
Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan are large suppliers of labour migrants for
Russia. This section of the article addresses vigilante acts
where labour migrants are targeted by ‘concerned’ citi-
zens in Russia. Described to be “the most violent coun-
try in the former Soviet Union for ethnic and racial mi-
norities” (Arnold, 2015, p. 243), Russia presents a chal-
lenging environment for migrants as the perceived of-
fence they emit is rooted in being foreign and non-Slavic.
Vulnerable status induced by corruption, lawlessness, le-
gal bureaucracy, legal illiteracy, language barriers, and
fear of deportation, subjects Central Asians to abuse and
retaliation performed both by the police (Alekseyeva,
2013; Kaliyev, 2018; Kislov & Zhanaev, 2017; Sindelar,
Bobomatov, Doorov, & Kholov, 2013) and by the citizens
in Russia (Kimmage, 2006; Parkin, 2018; SOVA Center
for Information and Analysis, 2014; Yudina & Alperovich,
2013, 2014). As one researcher from a Moscow-based
NGO explained, “In the past, there was a negative per-
ception of people from the North Caucasus republics,
now the focus has shifted towards people from Central
Asia…they are nowperceived in sociological terms as ‘the
other’” (NGO I).
5.1. Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia: A Brief Profile
Out of Kyrgyzstan’s 6.2 million citizens (The World Bank,
2017), state migration service estimates 800 thousand
people to be living abroad (Interfax, 2018). Precise in-
formation on the number of Kyrgyz labour migrants in
Russia is not available. While Kyrgyz State Migration Ser-
vice officials declare this number to be 640–650 thou-
sand (Interfax, 2018); Russia’s Ministry of Interior is sug-
gesting “more than 800,000” (Hasanova & Kapushenko,
2018). Beyond this, Kyrgyzstan is leading globally in
the share of remittances in the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), with “nearly 40%” of its GDP comprised of
the money transferred by labour migrants (Hasanova &
Kapushenko, 2018, para. 20). Worldwide Movement for
Human Rights (FIDH) reports that in 2016 women consti-
tuted 40%of Kyrgyz labourmigrants in Russia (2016, p. 4).
In comparison, femalemigrants to Russia fromother Cen-
tral Asian republics, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
represented less than 20% in each case (FIDH, 2016,
p. 19). Based on the data available for 2014, estimated
60% of all Kyrgyz migrants did not possess proper doc-
umentation “to comply with current migration rules of
countries of destination” (FIDH, 2016, p. 6). These data il-
lustrate several important factors. Contrary to the case of
other labourmigrant-supplier states in the region, where
men dominate the composition of this labour force, mi-
grants from Kyrgyzstan are nearly equally balanced in
the representation of men and women. While there is
a domestic dependency on income from labour migra-
tion, lack of proper documentation during the stay in the
host state creates a fertile ground for exploitation and
abuse by the police, the employers, human traffickers,
vigilantes, fellow migrants, etc.
5.2. Migrant-Focused Vigilantes
Among Russia’s numerous citizen groups who have taken
justice into own hands and retaliated on migrants and
other minorities are the nationalists, football hooligans,
pro-Kremlin youth groups, and neo-Nazi movements.
Migrant-focused vigilante groups include Occupy Viselay
[Occupy Evict], Mestnie [The Locals], Russkie [Russians],
Movement Against Illegal Immigration, Scheet Moskvi
[The Shield ofMoscow], and numerous other formations
that are in the constant flux of appearing and disappear-
ing across the country. Inmost cases, socialmedia is used
by these groups to coordinate activities with the mem-
bers and to spotlight these activities to the broader audi-
ence. Such visibility subjects the targets to greater retalia-
tion and “further dehumanizes and relentlessly shames”
them, while the punitive show is also used “to intimidate
anyonewhomay have beenwatching and violating social
rules” (Kasra, 2017, p. 185). Photo and video materials
produced by such vigilantes not only harm the targeted
individual, but serve as tools for mapping and targeting
the larger ‘other’—the alien group that these individuals
represent, i.e., migrants, Central Asians, Muslims, non-
Slavs, homosexuals, and other ‘deviants’.
Having peaked in the mid-2000s, Russia’s racist and
neo-Nazi violence is experiencing a decline. As such, in
2008 Moscow-based SOVA Center reported that across
Russia, “no less than 525 people were the victims
of racist and xenophobic violence, 97 of whom died”
(Kozhevnikova, 2009, para. 10). In 2010 “42 people died
and 401were injured”while in 2011 “23 people died and
154 received injuries” (Yudina, Alperovich, & Verkhovsky,
2012, para. 11). Preliminary findings for 2018 report
on 57 victims of “racist and other ideologically moti-
vated violence” and “at least 4” deaths (Yudina, 2019,
para. 6). The precise number of attacks on migrants is
difficult to acquire as targets avoid the police, while
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the “attackers, who used to brag about their ‘achieve-
ments’ online, have grown more cautious in the wake of
more active law enforcement pushback” observable in
the last few years (Yudina, 2019, para. 7). Russia’s vigi-
lantes, thus, are manoeuvring between the benefits and
the threats of visibility. Traditional media portrayal of
events and actors further informs the audience. Framed
as invaders and dangerous outsiders (Tolz, 2017), mi-
grants have fewer chances for the compassion of the
host state public in Russia. Respective legitimising fram-
ing of vigilantism, on the other hand, can inspire and at-
tract supporters.
5.3. Solidarity of Police and Vigilantes
Until recent state-sanctioned crackdowns on the far-
right groups and movements in Russia (Lenta.ru, 2017,
2018; Petkova, 2017; Yudina, 2017), the police largely
neglected cases of vigilante attacks on migrants and
other minorities. Beyond this, a collaboration between
vigilantes and the police was not an unusual arrange-
ment. This collaboration concerned not only the pro-
Kremlin youth groups but extended to the nationalists
who joined the so-called raids and “were also going side-
by-side with the police and UFMS [Federal Migration Ser-
vice]” (Rights defender I). While one of the interviewed
law enforcement officers in Russia explained that rogue
vigilantes more often get in the way of the police, rather
than providing real assistance; collaboration, neverthe-
less, was viewed as a plausible option.
If they [vigilantes] want to help us, they should turn to
us; wewill find a job for them. Therefore, I, in fact, pro-
pose acting in accordance with the principle in which
the Soviet druzhinas [volunteer militia] functioned.
They did not determine the area of own work and
own actions, but the police did so. The police deter-
mined where it needed assistance. This is exactly the
key difference between the currently present move-
ments and their help…although it is hard to even refer
to this as help. There were druzhinas that were really
of help for the police or the militia of that time. There
is a huge difference between the two. (Police I)
Other interviewed law enforcement officers shared the
sentiment of collaboration and stated that when it
comes to law enforcement, “the police alone cannot
manage, the society should be involved” (Police II).
Among the many disturbing acts performed by vigi-
lantes targeting ethnic minorities in Russia were the so-
called “white wagon” flash mobs, where the nationalists
attacked “non-Slavic” people on a “train or subway car”
(SOVACenter for Information andAnalysis, 2014, para. 1).
Sometimes in groups as small as five people, other times
in mobs of 40–50 people wearing “knitted and medi-
cal masks” ultra-right groups committed hate crimes in
public transport across Russia and while doing so, en-
joyed “relative impunity” (SOVA Center for Information
and Analysis, 2014, para. 10). Moscow-based rights de-
fender further explains this police patronage over vigi-
lantes as follows:
Themain idea here is to have some fun, to beat some-
one up, and to have some coordinated relation in col-
laboration with the police. Without this link to the po-
lice, this activity would not be possible. No neighbour-
hood officer needs this amateur activity at all. This is
only tolerated because there is some order for patron-
age from above. This is done to prevent mass fights.
If they [nationalist vigilantes] are already going to be
there anyway, it is better to take them under the pa-
tronage and to take their side as these are authorised
activities, in a rather broad sense. (Rights defender I)
An academic specialising in Russia explains this relation-
ship as a grey zone where state forces find some benefit
in collaboration with vigilantes. “The state is not inter-
ested in completely eradicating this grey zone as there is
always space for negotiation here. I don’t think the state
is very much interested in protecting gay rights or pro-
tectingmigrant rights” (Academic I). Beyondmedia savvi-
ness, vigilante citizens are savvy about the methods they
use in the context of Russia’s legal system. When some-
one is murdered, a legal investigation has to be launched
by default, but when someone is beaten and humiliated,
the victim must first appeal to the police. “When the na-
tionalists switched their methods and went from mur-
der to beating and humiliating, it became even harder to
keep them accountable, as no one files any complaints”
(Rights defender II). Naturally, within the state-vigilante
tandem and amid an array of other nuances and barriers,
the process of seeking justice after subjection to retalia-
tion is challenged. “If a person turns to the police, espe-
cially in a small town, they essentially bury themselves”—
a Moscow-based rights defender explained (Rights de-
fender II). Furthermore, “turning to the police would
cause recurrence of trauma, as victims would have to
face their perpetrators again” (Rights defender III). Thus,
even if the police were willing to take measures against
vigilante forces, technically they would be lacking legal
grounds to do so. A journalist from Kyrgyzstan who ex-
tensively researched and covered the life of Central Asian
labour migrants in Russia explained the absence of legal
appeals to the police as follows:
There are several reasons why the targets are silent.
One of the reasons is that whenever there are illegal
activities performed affecting the target, the target
cannot necessarily turn to the police, because many
migrants are undocumented or have an illegal regis-
tration. If such a person turns to the police for help,
they would have to present an immigration card, but
they cannot. They cannot present one, because their
employers do not register them. There is a violation
on top of a violation. (Journalist I)
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Even if the victim decides to turn to the police “in many
cases the perpetrators are not arrested—andwhen some
of them are, they are quite unlikely to be prosecuted
for what their actions really consist in, that is, hate
crimes” (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2014,
para. 10). These arrangements leave labour migrants
with scanty options for seeking justice. Gender biases, pa-
triarchal structures and traditional masculinity accompa-
nied by social frustrations in the host state, subject fe-
male labour migrants to yet another stratum of violence.
6. Female Migrants in the Bullseye of the Home State
Female labour migrants are not only subjected to
nationalism-based violence of host state vigilantes but
also fall target to fellow compatriots. Weaponising the
methods similar to those used against themby host state
vigilantes, self-proclaimed ‘patriots’ target women for
being “morally loose ‘traitors’ of the nation” because
they establish relations with “men of other ethnicities
(most often Tajiks)” (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 4). While
the target is humiliated and exposed, vigilantes prefer
to remain anonymous. One of the obvious reasons for
anonymity is “the opportunity to avoid punishment”, yet
it apparently also serves a purpose of symbolising “a de-
personified category of ‘defenders of the fatherland, pa-
triots’” (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 7). Expert interviews re-
veal that the ‘patriots’ are not a single or necessarily
unified formation. Groups appear to be acting sponta-
neously across Russia. Much like in the case with anti-
migrant vigilantes, after experiencing retaliation, targets
are limited in their options for seeking justice and face
the same barriers and obstacles that prevent them from
turning to the police, i.e., fear, lack of proper documen-
tation, shame, the unreliability of the legal system, etc.
6.1. Challenges in Being Vocal
Journalists covering the case hold an important role in
their interactions with the targets. Sometimes, during
their interviews with the targets, the journalists per-
suaded them to be vocal and to turn to the police, with
the hope that publicity of the case would scare the per-
petrators and, as a result, would prevent future attacks.
A journalist whoworked closely with victims of the ‘patri-
ots’ recalls: “One girl hadwritten an appeal. I asked her to
write it. Shewrote an appeal to the police, to the local po-
lice [in Kyrgyzstan]. They started the case. They identified
these men. But nothing happened. No one was brought
to justice” (Journalist III). Sometimes the journalists cov-
ering the case are the only party the victim can rely on
for assistance:
I found her [target of the ‘patriots’] phone number
and I called her, and I talked to her. Another girl, she
came back to Kyrgyzstan and I found her with the help
of the local police. They found her for me, as she was
living with her parents. Hermother died and they [the
police] helped me find her. I went there and inter-
viewed her. She told me everything. We helped her.
We took her to the crisis centre; we helped her out
financially. (Journalist III)
At the same time, there are also concerns about theman-
ner in which the journalists, the experts, and rights de-
fenders respond to the issue. “What is interesting is that
the experts and rights defenders, while having the desire
to express their own stance on the matter, they share
the videos. They, thus, contribute to the dissemination
of these videos” (Journalist I). The stance on the issue of
harms caused by traditional media reports is contested
among the journalists themselves:
On the one hand, yes, you can view it as a perpetu-
ation of retaliation. But, on the other hand, you also
attract the attention of the society to a given issue.
Many peoplewere sharing [these videos] not because
they support such acts, but because they were dis-
turbed by them. (Journalist II)
Having failed to find justice, targets prefer to stay out of
the media spotlight and are reluctant to continue coop-
erating with the journalists or other parties interested in
the case. One of the interviewed journalists who had ex-
tensivelywritten on targets of the ‘patriots’ attempted to
write a follow-up story on a prominent case a few years
after the initial coverage, but the victim refused to par-
ticipate. “She does not want us to write about her, be-
cause she has children and they might read this mate-
rial” (Journalist III). Additional harms erect when media
coverage does not lead to the accountability of the per-
petrators and instead intensifies the suffering of targets.
6.2. No Support on the Home Front
The society in the home state was polarised in its
stance on the issue of digitally mediated honour beat-
ing of women by their male compatriots. One of the
interviewed journalists provided the following account:
“many were against the methods [of the ‘patriots’], but
some were in support. This may sound wild, but some
people were supporting [the ‘patriots’] and saying, ‘yes,
this is right, our girls should not be dating others’”
(Journalist II). The appalling supportive moods are also
evident in the survey conducted by the United Nations
Population Fund [UNFPA], according to which:
[A] fairly large proportion of respondents (38% of
women and 45%ofmen) believe thatwomen inmigra-
tion, working away from home, begin to lead immoral
life. On this basis, 51% of women and 55% ofmen sup-
port the activities of nationalist organizations, who
“follow/or trace” the moral image of women from the
Kyrgyz Republic, stripping, raping them and uploading
their photos and “punishment” videos for bad behav-
ior. (2016, p. 155)
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While condemning broader violence, state officials pro-
vide further legitimisation of the activities of the ‘pa-
triots’ by scrutinising the victims. Kyrgyzstan’s Interior
Ministry representative in Moscow, for instance, made
the following statement on Facebook after the punitive
videos spread online:
The view of knives and stun guns should scare any-
body who has seen these videos. But naturally, as
a brother and future father, I cannot support the
lifestyle that some of our young women lead, which
provokes a strong reaction amongst Kyrgyz country-
men. (FIDH, 2016, p. 38)
The official also added that “when they [Kyrgyz women]
come to Russia in search of work, they cannot resist all
the challenges they encounter, and they become the
playthings of Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek and Caucasian men,
who take advantage them” (Lelik, 2016). These percep-
tions, moods and discourses constitute social realities
where female targets of digitally mediated abuse are fur-
ther blamed offline.
Beyond this, back in the home state, nationalist
movements engaging in moral policing with the focus
on women, sexual minorities, and foreigners are also
prevalent. An example of such forces is the so-called Kyrk
Choro [Forty Knights] movement claiming membership
of 5,000 across Kyrgyzstan (Lelik, 2015). Kyrk Choro car-
ried out several nightclub raids in the country’s capital
of Bishkek where they have “lined up local women be-
fore a video camera” accusing them of prostitution (Lelik,
2015). Just like the Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ in Russia, Kyrk Choro
members are concerned about Kyrgyz women dating for-
eigners and express anti-Chinese and anti-Uyghur senti-
ments (Chynybaeva & Najibullah, 2015). These cases il-
lustrate contested morality and nationalism in the host
state of Kyrgyz migrants and raise important questions
over the perceived roles and positions of women amid
these contestations.
7. Conclusion
Digital media render important affordances in the lives
of migrants, providing the ability to connect with friends
and family, to store and access important documents,
to connect with people in the host state, and numer-
ous other possibilities. Yet, it is evident that offline in-
equalities, biases, and divides transmit into the digital
sphere. Groups and individuals vulnerable offline are
also vulnerable to online threats, such as digital vigilan-
tism, where visibility is exploited as a magnifier of em-
bodied harms. Through the selected case study of Kyrgyz
labourmigrants in Russia, this article illustrated how digi-
tal divides affect vulnerabilities across and within groups.
Namely, the study presented a scenario where offline bi-
ases penetrate online and consequently re-inform the of-
fline sphere. The study, in particular, demonstrated how
within such a structure, women are subjected to multi-
vector scrutiny, while their ability to be vocal and seek
justice is challenged and jeopardised. Having crossed the
Russian border, a female labour migrant from Kyrgyzstan
is subjected to police abuse, retaliation by host state na-
tionalist groups, and retaliation performed by male com-
patriots in migration. Falling victim to citizen-led retali-
ation in the host state, labour migrants are reluctant to
turn to the police, as the police itself is an abusive force,
which engages in patronage over vigilantes. As such, turn-
ing to the police can lead to abuse and deportation,while
chances of bringing perpetrators to justice are minimal.
Moreover, female labour migrants experience additional
barriers to seeking justice in the home state due to so-
cial norms and biases that culminate in online and offline
victim-blaming and shaming. Upon returning home, they
are confronted by their relatives, by domestic nationalist
groups, and by the greater community in the neighbour-
hood, village/town, and beyond. Digitally mediated retal-
iation, in its turn, brings about globality and permanence
of exposure.
Further cross-national empirical research is neces-
sary for a nuanced assessment of the digital divides and
vulnerabilities in the context of social change, social ben-
efits, and social harm that digital media renders. Specific
contexts can include variant political environments as
well as divergent social dynamics, positions, and norms.
Studies could look beyond South-North migration and
address cases in South-South and North-South migra-
tory scenarios.
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Appendix
Interview data
Academic I. Professor specialising in Runet (Russian internet). Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. April 2018.
Journalist I. Extensively covered Central Asian labour migrants in Russia. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
Journalist II. Extensively covered the case of Kyrgyz ‘patriots’. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
Journalist III. Has access to the targets of the Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ and extensively covered the case. Interviewed in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
NGO I. Public opinion researcher in Russia. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
Rights defender I. Specialises in cases of xenophobia. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
Rights defender II. Specialises in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia.
May 2018.
Rights defender III. Specialises in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia.
May 2018.
Police I. Lieutenant colonel. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
Police II. Moscow, Russia. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
Vigilante citizen I. Paedophile buster. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
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